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Abstract  
Most existing analyses on the gender wage gap (GWG) have neglected the establishment as a 
place where inequality between male and female employees arises and is maintained. The use 
of linked employee-employer data permits us to move beyond the individual and consider the 
importance of the workplace to explain gender pay differentials. That is, we first provide a 
comprehensive study on the effects of various firm characteristics and the institutional 
framework on the GWG in Germany. The innovation of our research is that we do not just 
compare average male and female wages (of specific groups of employees), but look at 
within-firm gender wage differentials. Our results indicate that the mean GWG within firms is 
smaller than the average overall GWG. Furthermore, we can show that firms with formalized 
co-determination (works council) and those covered by collective wage agreements are more 
likely to have smaller GWG. It is also interesting to note that the wage differential between 
men and women decreases with firm size and increases with the wage level. 
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Non-technical summary 
Most studies analyze gender pay differentials by focusing primarily on differences in the 
wage-determining characteristics of men and women and how these characteristics are 
rewarded. The goal of our research is to move beyond the individual and consider the 
importance of the workplace to explain gender pay differentials. The innovation of our 
research approach is that we do not just compare average male and female wages (of specific 
groups of employees), but look at within-firm gender wage differentials. In the following 
study, we will focus on the impact of works council and the collective bargaining coverage. 
An attempt to explain the wage differences between men and women would not be 
comprehensive and convincing, if Becker’s theory on discrimination were not considered at 
all. We hence propose alternative concepts to test the hypotheses derived from the 
discrimination model. The empirical analysis is based on the German LIAB data, a 
representative linked employer-employee panel including information on all employees of 
firms covered by the IAB establishment survey. 
To investigate the theoretical hypotheses regarding the effect of firm and institutional 
characteristics on wage inequality, we define two alternative measures describing the firm-
specific gender wage gap (GWG). First, we use the observed wage gap as the difference 
between the mean wages of males and females within an establishment. One important factor 
explaining this observed wage gap is the difference in the human capital endowment and 
other labor market relevant characteristics of the employees. As a second measure, we 
therefore calculate a wage gap under the assumption that male and female employees would 
have the same characteristics within each firm. 
Our results indicate that the mean GWG within firms is smaller than the mean overall GWG. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that firms bargaining their wages within the framework of 
collective agreements exhibit a smaller gender pay gap. Given that most unions are still 
dominated by men, this result is not self-evident. An additional effect of unions with a higher 
female share is not empirically detectable. The results also point to a gender equalizing 
effect of formalized co-determination (works councils). Again, the hypothesis that works 
councils only realize the interests of women if they represent a larger part of the staff is not 
supported by the data. Finally, we tested Becker’s hypothesis on discrimination using 
various alternative variables. In summary, we can not find consistent evidence for the 
discrimination model, though.  
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1. Introduction 
The gender earnings differential is an intensely studied issue in labor economics and other 
social sciences. Most studies analyze gender pay differentials by focusing primarily on 
differences in the wage-determining characteristics of men and women and how these 
characteristics are rewarded. Differences in the return to specific human capital measures are 
generally denoted as discrimination and not analyzed any further. The idea that firms play an 
important role in creating and maintaining gender inequality by the way they define and 
reward jobs as well as by their recruiting and training practices, have become more and more 
popular during the last decade (see e.g. Baron 1984; Acker 1990, 1992). According to this 
approach, firms are no sex-neutral organizations. Looking closely at the design of work 
processes, pay systems, internal qualification activities and firm philosophy often reveals the 
firm’s image of male and female employees and its attitude towards gender equality. In 
Germany, the wage setting process is not just the result of free negotiations between the 
individual and its employer, but also subject to various legislations. In this vein, pay 
differentials between men and women also depend upon the way the right of co-
determination is implemented and put into practice and whether firms are subject to 
collective wage agreements or not. While it is well accepted that these firm characteristics 
affect the wage level as well as the wage distribution (see e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger 1991; 
Bronars and Famulari 1997; Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999), most empirical studies do 
not examine how firm characteristics and the institutional environment affect the gender 
earnings differentials within firms.1  
The goal of our research is to move beyond the individual and consider the importance of the 
workplace to explain gender pay differentials. The empirical analysis is based on the German 
LIAB data, a representative linked employer-employee panel including information on all 
employees of firms covered by the IAB establishment survey. The LIAB merges annual 
survey data (the IAB-establishment panel) and process generated individual data (the 
Employment Statistical Register of the IAB, which is based on administrative social security 
records).  
There already exist some studies analyzing the effects of firm-specific characteristics on the 
gender wage gap (GWG) based on linked employer-employee data for other countries. 
                                                          
1 However, there are international studies like Blau und Kahn (1995) which analyses the impact of institutions on 
the gender wage gap in a cross-country comparison. 
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Reilly and Wirjanto (1999) as well as Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) include both 
personal and establishment-level information to point out the effect of segregation on the 
earnings differences between men and women in Canada and Denmark. Drolet (2002) 
investigates how much of the Canadian pay gap can be attributed to specific workplace 
characteristics, such as high-performance workplace practices or training expenditures. Datta 
Gupta and Eriksson (2004) analyze the relationship between new workplace practices and 
the GWG. Meng (2004) and Meng and Meurs (2004) extend the traditional decomposition of 
the observed gap in an endowment and a remuneration effect by an additional firm effect. In 
this setting, the firm effect represents the difference between the firm’s premiums paid to 
male and female employees and can be interpreted as employer discrimination. In a second 
step, the impact of firm characteristics on this discrimination term is determined. Simón and 
Russell (2005) analyze the GWG in a set of EU countries with a cross-national survey of 
matched employer-employee data. They show that workplace characteristics are very 
relevant in explaining wage differences between males and females in all countries. 
The innovation of our research approach is that we do not just compare average male and 
female wages (of specific groups of employees), but look at within-firm gender wage 
differentials. Provided that the distribution of women among firms is not random, the results 
of this approach may differ tremendously from traditional analyses looking at overall wage 
differentials. The aim of our study is to analyze explicitly the impact of firm characteristics 
and the institutional framework on the GWG within establishments. Given the rich 
information on the establishments in our survey, we can control for many firm-specific 
attributes and features, such as size, wage level, female share or qualification level of the 
staff. In the following study, we will focus on the impact of works council and the collective 
bargaining coverage. An attempt to explain the wage differences between men and women 
would not be comprehensive and convincing, if Becker’s theory on discrimination were not 
considered at all. We hence propose alternative concepts to test the hypotheses derived from 
the discrimination model. 
To investigate the theoretical hypotheses regarding the effect of firm and institutional 
characteristics on wage inequality, we define two alternative measures describing the firm-
specific GWG. First, we use the observed wage gap as the difference between the mean 
wages of males and females within an establishment. One important factor explaining this 
observed wage gap is the difference in the human capital endowment and other labor market 
relevant characteristics of the employees. As a second measure, we therefore calculate a 
wage gap under the assumption that male and female employees would have the same 
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characteristics within each firm. Note that in both cases the censoring of our wage variable is 
accommodated by a Tobit model. Using these two measures for the GWG as dependent 
variable in the second step, we can determine the impact of selected firm characteristics and 
the institutional framework on the wage inequality within firms using regression analyses. 
Based on our results, we provide new insights into the nature and the sources of gender wage 
inequality in Germany.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
background of our empirical analysis. The econometric methodology is expounded in 
Section 3. Section 4 describes our data source and in the following section the results are 
presented. Section 6 concludes.   
2. Theoretical Background 
So far, there exists no theory which explicitly deals with the gender wage differences within 
firms. However, hypotheses about the impact of selected firm characteristics or institutional 
settings on wage inequality within firms can be derived from deliberations in other theories 
like collective bargaining models or the model of employer discrimination (Becker 1957).   
According to the discrimination model gender earnings differentials may be attributed to two 
sources. First, differences in labor productivity between men and women and second, direct 
discrimination by employers, employees and customers against women. As Gary Becker 
himself puts it: 
If an individual has a “taste for discrimination”, he must act as if he were willing to pay 
something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some 
persons instead of others. When actual discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either pay or 
forfeit income for this privilege. This simple way of looking at the matter gets at the essence 
of prejudice and discrimination.( p. 14) 
Employers with “taste of discrimination” against women will hire fewer than the profit-
maximizing number of women and consequently employ more men who are equally skilled 
yet more highly paid. However, in a competitive market discrimination is costly and restricts 
the employer’s scale and profitability. Hence, Arrow (1973) and Cain (1986), among others, 
argue that under strong product market competition firms may not be able to afford 
discrimination and will therefore behave more egalitarian. Assuming that larger firms are 
more likely to have market power than smaller firms, this hypothesis can be tested by the 
firm size. Furthermore, we use the relative firm size to test the hypothesis that firms with 
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more market power may be able to afford more discrimination. The relative firm size is 
measured by the number of employees within the firm relative to the number of employees 
within the industry sector. Alternatively, we test Becker’s model by a variable describing the 
export quota of the firm. The underlying idea is that firms operating on the world market are 
more subject to competition than firms operating only on the local or national market. 
Hence, exporting firms are more likely to pay male and female workers the value of their 
marginal products, which is assumed not to differ by sex.  
Another hypothesis derived from Becker’s model is that employers who hire more women 
are expected to have less prejudice against women and hence are more likely to pay equal 
wages to men and women. In order to examine this point we include the percentage of 
female employees in total employment. 
Perhaps one of the most important factors influencing wage determination within firms is 
whether wages are subject to collective bargaining or not (Elvira and Saporta 2001). This 
insight is particularly true for Germany, where unions still play an important role in the wage 
setting process. While the overall impact of unions on the GWG is not obvious, collective 
bargaining models provide several reasons for arguing that collective agreements tend to 
reduce the GWG within establishments. First of all, it is argued that unions generally reduce 
the wage dispersion among employees covered by the same collective bargaining agreement, 
especially those working in the same occupation (Freeman and Medoff 1984, Fitzenberger 
and Kohn 2005). As a consequence, unionization should reduce the GWG for women 
performing the same activity as male colleagues in the same firm. Furthermore, Freeman 
(1980) exposes that unions tend to reduce the wage differentials within and across 
establishments regardless of occupation by setting fixed wage levels for specific jobs.2 
Therefore, the gap between segregated female and male jobs should also narrow.  
Cornfield (1987) points out that in the case of layoffs bureaucratic rules consequently reduce 
the potential of discrimination. Elvira and Saporta (2001) apply the same logic to the wage 
setting process. They argue that the management of unionized firms are more likely to 
adhere to such bureaucratic wage setting rules, reducing the arbitrariness in wage rates and 
generating more predictable wages for male and female employees. That way the potential of 
discrimination and the GWG should be reduced.  
But aren’t these arguments too innocent considering the distribution of men and women 
among the union members? According to Koch-Baumgarten (2002), the importance of 
                                                          
2 That means, „uniform piece or time rates among comparable workers across establishments and impersonal 
rates or ranges of rates in a given occupational class within establishments” (Freeman, 1980, p.4). 
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women is increasing, but they still represent a minority among the union members in 
Germany. Among the members of the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), that is the 
umbrella organization of all unions (Federation of German Trade Unions), 30.4% of all 
members are female in 1999. Even if some unions have adopted pay equity as a strategic 
policy goal – maybe in order to attract new members in times of massive union withdrawals 
– it is hence not obvious that unions actively aim at reducing the GWG in general. 
Regardless of the motivation to foster women’s wages, the existence of such pay equity 
policies would raise the wage in female dominated jobs relative to predominantly male jobs, 
thereby narrowing the gender gap (Acker 1989).  
In order to examine the effect of unionization on the GWG we include variables describing 
whether a firm is subject to collective agreements or not. More precisely, we distinguish 
between industry-wide collective wage agreements, firm-specific collective wage 
agreements as well as wage determination without collective bargaining coverage. Industry-
wide collective wage agreements are negotiated between an industry-specific union and an 
employers’ association. The wage rates set by collective agreements are legally binding for 
all firms being members of the respective employers’ association. Note that in Germany 
employers do in general not differentiate between unionists and non-unionists because non-
unionized employees who would receive a lower wage are expected to join the union 
anyway in order to benefit from higher union wage. The firm-specific collective wage 
agreements are negotiated between an individual firm and the sector-specific trade union. 
Those agreements should offer more flexibility to adjusting the wage structure to the firm’s 
economic situation and requirements than industry-wide collective wage agreements.3  
Assuming that unions aim at representing the preferences of their members, we also exploit 
information of the female share among the members of the different German unions. We 
would expect that collective agreements with a union whose female share is high (e.g. unions 
bargaining in the retail sector) are more likely to reduce the firm-specific GWG than a 
collective agreement with a union that is still dominated by men, such as the IG BAU (union 
for the construction, agriculture and forestry sector). Based on this background information 
which is merged to our firm-level data, we can test whether unions tend to reduce the GWG 
in general, or whether this effect only occurs in unions with high female shares.  
                                                          
3 In recent years, contractual opting-out clauses or hardship clauses have become a widespread element of central 
agreements. In general the adoption of such clauses requires the approval of collective bargaining parties (Hassel 
1999). 
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Furthermore, not only collective wage contracts, but also works councils affect the wage 
distribution within firms (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Note that works councils can not directly 
engage in the wage bargaining but they may influence the firm’s wage structure by the right 
of co-determination to negotiate about the placing of workers in different wage groups. 
Therefore, we control also for existence of works councils in firms. In general it is assumed 
that employees’ representations follow up the aim of reducing inequality among employees 
within firms. As a result, the existence of a works council should counteract wage inequality 
within firms. More differentiated hypotheses about the objectives of works councils can be 
derived from the Insider-Outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). According to this 
approach, works councils act in favor of the majority of the workforce while interests of the 
fringe group are neglected. In this setting, works councils foster equal treatment of male and 
female employees only in firms with a high female quota. A male dominated work force is 
presumably associated with a male dominated works council which is unlikely to promote 
wage equality. Therefore, the effect of employees’ representation on the GWG is not 
unambiguous, too. To see whether the effect of works councils depend upon the female share 
among the staff, we further include an interaction term between the works council-dummy 
and the firm-specific share of women.  
3. Methodology 
In this study we examine the interaction between firm characteristics, institutions, market 
effects and gender specific earnings inequality on the firm level. The empirical analysis of 
the gender wage differential within firms is only feasible with linked employer-employee 
data.  
To investigate the theoretical hypothesis we define two measures reflecting the degree of 
wage inequality within a firm. First, we use the observed wage gap: 
(1) 1 ln lnm fj ijGap w w= − ij
where wij denotes the earnings for individual i at firm j; superscripts m and f refer to male 
and female observations. Since the wage information in our data set is right-censored (see 
Section 4 for more details), the observed wage gap defined in equation (1) underestimates 
the actual raw wage differential. In order to determine the actual observed wage gap we 
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apply a simple Tobit model.4 By estimating the following equation for each firm, we can 
directly derive the wage differential between male and female employees: 
,ln    )2( ijijjjij femw μγα ++=
where α  is an absolute term measuring the average wage rate in firm j,  is a dummy 
variable reflecting the gender of individual i and 
fem
ijμ  denotes the error term. The estimated 
coefficient jγˆ  then represents the raw GWG in firm j (Gap1j) taking into account that wij is 
censored from above. 
The sources of the observed wage gap can be manifold. On the one hand male and female 
employees differ with regard to their human capital endowment and other labor market 
relevant characteristics. On the other hand the endowments of men and women are 
remunerated in different ways. Finally, firm policy may effectively determine the size of the 
GWG. From an economic viewpoint the wage gap due to differences in occupational skills 
shall be deemed to be justified and comprehensible. Therefore, we calculate a second 
measure of the gender pay differential which is adjusted by the difference in human capital 
of employees:  
( )fijmjmijmjjj XXGapGap ββ ˆˆ12     (3) −−=
ijX  includes mean characteristics of the individuals i at firm j and  is a vector of 
estimated coefficients – derived from wage regressions – of the individual characteristics X
m
jβˆ
ij 
of male employees in firm j. Hence, Gap2 reflects the difference in the rewards for 
individual human capital characteristics and unobserved wage effects between male and 
female employees within each firm j. The calculation of this measure requires the estimation 
of wage equations for male employees only. In order to allow for the heterogeneity and 
complexity of the wage setting process we estimate – as far as possible – a separate wage 
The dependent variable 
equation for each firm: 
describes the daily log wage rate. We restrict the wage equation to a 
                                                          
m
ij
m
ij
m
j
m
ij Xw εβ +=ln    )4(
standard Mincer equation aiming to adjust the observed wage rate by differences in human 
capital endowments between men and women. Since other possible wage determinants, such 
as the occupational status and the occupational group are determined by the human capital, 
we exclude them from our wage equation. Hence, Xijm includes potential experience 
4 Alternatively, we could use imputed wage information which is available in the data. However these wage rates 
are estimated in a different model. Thus other explanatory variables and a different sample are used to explain 
the wages.  
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(squares), dummy variables for different education levels and job tenure. The right-censoring 
of the dependent variable again requires the estimation of a Tobit model. In order to make 
sure that our firm-specific wage estimations are reliable, we only take into account firms 
with at least hundred male employees. This procedure is most suitable to take into account 
the heterogeneity among firms. This benefit is, however, only feasible at the expense of the 
number of considered firms. In order to exploit the information of firms with less than 
hundred male employees, we run pooled regressions for all establishments with twenty up to 
ninety-nine male employees: 
In contrast to equation (4), where we determine firm-specific coefficients (βj), we now 
e Gap2 which 
es for the firm-specific wage differential as dependent variable 
ell as the GWG which is adjusted for the difference in 
                                                          
estimate the average impact of the human capital characteristics in all smaller firms (β). By 
applying different strategies for smaller and larger firms, we are able to determine the 
adjusted wage gap for the vast majority of the establishments in our sample.  
Given the results of equation (4) and (5) respectively, we can calculat
describes the GWG within firms assuming that men had the same human capital endowment 
as women within a firm. Note, however, that part of the differences in characteristics may be 
caused by inequality with respect to access and the encouragement to education, though. 
Furthermore, there might be a discriminating element in the selection of employees such that 
observed characteristics of employees as well as estimated coefficients are not distributed 
randomly across firms.5  
Using these two measur
allows us to analyze the effect of firm characteristics and institutional framework on the 
wage inequality within firms.  
 
The observed wage gap (Gap1) as w
human capital characteristics (Gap2) is assumed to depend on the vector Zj including firm 
characteristics and information to the institutional framework of firm j. δ captures the impact 
of the corresponding explanatory variables, derived from the theories expounded in Section 
2. To investigate the hypotheses based on Becker’s discrimination model, we use the relative 
firm size within the sector, the export quota and the proportion of female employees. 
ijijij
.2,1=
mmmm Xw εβ +=ln    )5(
         ,   )6( += KZGapK jjj εδ
5 In order to correct for this selection we would have to estimate employment probabilities (Datta Gupta, 1993). 
Due to the lack of information on the household context and the individual background, it is difficult to 
implement this procedure which requires convincing exclusion restrictions.   
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Implications from the bargaining model are tested by variables like “application of collective 
wage agreements” and “existence of a works council”. To see whether the naive notion of 
collective bargaining, that is, unions aim at rising wages at the lower tail of the wage 
distribution – irrespective of the sex – , holds, we add the female quota of union members in 
the relevant union to vector Zj in equation (6). A positive coefficient of the female share in 
the corresponding union would suggest that unions with a high female quota are more 
successful in reducing the wage gap between men and women. In order to test whether the 
works council acts in favor of the majority of the workforce, we interact the existence of a 
works council with the female quota in the firm. Other than the mentioned variables we use 
also some control variables such as regions, industry and firm size.  
In this second estimation step we can exploit the panel structure of the data by applying a 
4. Data  
The present analysis of the effects of firm characteristics and institutional framework on the 
establishment panel is an annual survey of German establishments, which started 
in West-Germany in 1993 and was extended to East Germany in 1996.7 The data is collected 
                                                          
random effects model. As a result, firm specific heterogeneity is captured by the random 
effect determined by the estimation model. In the first estimation step, that is the wage 
estimation, it is not possible to apply fixed-effects panel estimation in a Tobit model. Even if 
it would be straightforward to apply a random effects Tobit model, we currently refrain from 
this approach because of computer time restrictions. In principle, one could include both 
estimation steps within one model equation. We refrain from doing so due to the huge 
amount of data.  
wage inequality within firms requires individual and firm information. For that reason we 
use a representative German employer-employee linked panel data set. This data set is 
constructed by merging the IAB-establishment panel and the employment statistic of the 
German Federal Services based on a unique firm identification number. To test the 
hypothesis concerning the effect of the female share among union members, we further 
merged union membership data on the sector level. Information on the share of women 
among the union members is published on the homepage of the Federation of German Trade 
Unions.6  
The IAB- 
6 http://www.dgb.de/dgb/mitgliederzahlen/mitglieder.htm. 
ven by Kölling (2000). 7 Detailed information on the IAB-establishment panel is gi
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by personal interviews with the owners or senior managers of smaller establishments and 
personnel managers in larger establishments. It is performed by specially trained 
professional interviewers from a well-known market research institute. As far as possible, 
the survey is carried out by the same interviewer and interviewee each year. This procedure 
ensures a response rate above 70% which is high compared to other non-official German 
establishment panel studies (Kölling 2000) and helps to reduce panel attrition to less than 
20% per year.8 In order to keep the panel representative and correct for panel mortality, 
exits, and newly-founded units, additional establishments are drawn each year, yielding an 
unbalanced panel. These additional establishments are stratified with respect to ten 
categories of establishment size and 34 economic sectors.  
The sample unit is the establishment as the local business unit. Note that firm and 
establishment are used as synonyms in this paper, though. The establishments asked in the 
s in Germany paying social 
survey are selected from the parent sample of all German establishments that employ at least 
one employee covered by social security. Thus, self-employed and establishments that 
employ only people not covered by social security (mineworkers, farmers, artists, journalists, 
etc.) as well as public employers with solely civil servants do not belong to the original 
sample. The data set is a representative sample of German establishments employing at least 
one employee who pays social security contributions. The establishments covered by the 
survey have been questioned every year about turnover, number of employees, personnel 
problems, industrial relations, wage policies, apprenticeship training, investments, 
innovations, and business strategies. From time to time, additional topics, such as training 
and human resource policies, were added to the questionnaire. 
The employment statistic of the German Federal Services, so-called Employment Statistics 
Register, is an administrative panel data set of all employee
security contributions.9 The Employment Statistics are collected by the social insurance 
institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced in 1973. These data cover 
the period between 1975 and 2002, that is, every person who was employed for at least one 
day from 1975 to 2002 and/or with claims to pension benefits is included.10 During this 
                                                          
8 The establishments are first approached by a letter indicating the goals of the survey. This letter is accompanied 
by separate letters of recommendation by the president of the Federal Employment Services and the leader of the 
German employer’s association. Some weeks after this announcement letter, the establishment is contacted by 
g time during which the non-working 
telephone in order to arrange an individual appointment for the interview. 
9 Information on the Employment Statistics Register is given by Bender, Haas and Klose (2000). 
10 These are people who, as employees, have paid contributions to the pension system or who have been covered 
by the pension system through contributions by the unemployment insurance or by being a parent (depending on 
the birth year of the child, a fixed number of years is counted as child carin
parent becomes entitled to receive pension benefits). 
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time, social security contributions were mandatory for all employees who earned more than a 
lower earnings limit. Civil servants, self employed and people with marginal jobs, that is, 
employees whose earnings are below a lower earnings limit or temporary jobs which last 50 
working days at most, are not covered by this sample. Altogether, the Employment Statistics 
Register represents about 80 percent of all West German employees. According to the 
statutory provisions, employers have to report information for all employed contributor at 
the beginning and end of their employment spells. In addition an annual report for each 
employee is compulsory at the end of a year. This report contains information on an 
employee’s occupation, the occupational status, qualification, sex, age, nationality, industry 
and the size of the employer. Also the available information on daily gross earnings refers to 
employment spells that employers report to the Federal Employment Service.11 If the wage 
rate exceeds the upper earnings limit (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”), the daily social security 
threshold is reported instead.12 Note that the daily wage rate is therefore censored from 
above – mostly relevant for men – and truncated from below, which concerns women’s 
wages in particular.  
Both data sets contain a unique firm identifier which is used to match information on all 
devaluation of female labor as well as the crowding out of women in the labor market and 
employees paying social security contributions with the establishment in the IAB-
establishment panel. We restrict our sample to West German establishments of the private 
sector who participated in the IAB-establishment panel in one year from 1997 to 2001. East 
German firms are not considered in the analysis, because both the wage level as well as the 
wage setting process is still very different. Given the small number of union members in East 
Germany and the limited application of co-determination, the effect of the institutional 
framework is supposed to be less relevant. Therefore, a common investigation of both 
regions would not be very meaningful. Furthermore, the GWG is much smaller in East 
Germany. A separate analysis for East Germany is not possible either, because the number of 
firms employing at least 100 male employees is too small to derive reliable results. Apart 
from that, the wage setting process and the resulting GWG in East German establishments is 
likely to be driven by internal processes, which can not be captured by our data, such as the 
particularly women in occupations which were dominated by females in East Germany 
before unification.  
                                                          
11 To deal with the problem of overlapping spells, we apply a hierarchical order of activities where employment 
trumps all other activities.  
12 Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2000) show that this affects particularly the wage rate of high-skilled 
employees. According to their results, about 50 percent of high-skilled men earn wages above the upper earnings 
limit. Among high-skilled full-time females, this share amounts to at least 20 percent.  
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We exclude firms which employ only women or only men because a GWG is not observable 
in these organizations.  
One innovation of our study is the firm-specific estimation of the wage equations. Based on 
these results, we can calculate an adjusted wage gap (Gap2) accommodating the firm-
to larger firms. These are firms employing at least 100 full-time 
hese figures separately for 
(2) (3) value (in 
logarithm) 
logarithm) 
(5) 
logarithm)
(6) 
specific wage setting process. To guarantee the reliability of our estimation results, we 
restrict this procedure 
employed German men who are subject to social insurance contributions and are aged 
between 20 and 60 years. Since this condition does not hold for many smaller 
establishments, we would have to skip many firms and information on the determinants of 
the firm-specific GWG. To maximize the number of establishments in the second estimation 
step, we apply an alternative estimation strategy for smaller firms. The employees of firms 
employing twenty to ninety-nine full-time employed German men are considered in a pooled 
wage estimation. Firms with less than 20 employees are excluded from the analysis, because 
in most cases the calculation of the firm-specific GWGs as well as their regression on the 
firm characteristics derived in Section 2 is not very meaningful.  
Table 1 shows the number of firms as well as the number of their male and female 
employees in each observation year which enters the wage estimations. The rather small 
share of female employees results from our sample definition, which excludes the public 
sector and all part-time employees. Table A1 and A2 present t
firms employing 20 to 99 full-time employed men and firms employing at least 100 full-time 
employed men in the appendix. The number of different firms entering our estimation is 
4,520, of which 2,479 establishments belong to the group of smaller firms and 2,041 are 
large firms.  
Table 1: Description of the sample and the gender wage gap 
Year Number 
of firms  
(1) 
Number of 
male 
employees 
Number of 
female 
employees
Within-firm 
GWG based 
on reported 
Adjusted 
Within-firm 
GWG (in 
Adjusted 
overall 
GWG (in 
(4) 
1997 1,570 690,371 193,220 0.190 0.204 0.197 
1998 1,681 6  1
1999 1  
2000 2,743 678,777 192,904 
2001 3,090 753,536 216,638 0.199 0.208 
44,703
584,101 
85,064 
167,953 
0.188 
0.184 
0.187 
0.184 
0.201 
0.198 
0.200 
0.206 
0.207 
0.208 
,708
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 20 male employees. 
So n cal  LIA 7-20
 
urce: ow culation; B-Data 199 01 
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Table 1 also includes inf abo G in t ple. The 4 mn cont e 
av of th rved wag ithin f s defined ation ( s 
figure is based on the reported wage rates and ignores that the actual values could be higher. 
 wa e rates above the upper earnings 
limit while this is true for only 3 percent of the female employees. As a result, the measure 
d hence much of the heterogeneity 
ormation ut the GW he sam th colu ains th
erage e obse  gender e gaps w irms a  in equ 1). Thi
In our sample, 14 percent of the male employees earn g
based on equation (1) underestimates the true GWG within firms. In order to correct for the 
right-censoring of the wage information, we estimate equation (2) with a Tobit model. The 
average of the estimated raw wage gaps within firms is presented in the 5th column. As 
expected, the actual raw wage gap is higher then the calculated values in column 4.  
The average wage gap in the last column is corrected for the censoring, but compares the 
wage rates of males and females across all firms. That is, equation (2) is estimated by a 
pooled Tobit model across all employees. Apart from 1997, the overall wage gap is a little 
higher than the wage differential within firms. The difference between these two measures of 
gender wage differential indicates that women tend to select into lower paying firms. A look 
at Table A1 and A2 in the appendix reveals that the difference between the within-firm 
GWG and the overall GWG is larger in establishments with at least 100 male employees. 
The average difference amounts to almost 5 percentage points. This result indicates that the 
segregation process is more pronounced in large firms. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Gap1 and Gap2 in all firms. Gap1 has a mean of 0.2 and a 
standard deviation of 0.16. Gap2 is smaller on average with a mean of 0.16. The 
corresponding standard deviation amounts to 0.15. The peak of both measures is right of 
zero, which illustrates the fact that in most firms men earn higher wages than women. Since 
Gap2 controls for the differences in human capital an
between firms, the distribution of Gap2 is steeper and the mode appears to be at a lower level 
than the one of Gap1.  
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Figure 1: Kernel estimation of Gap1 and Gap2 
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Note: Gap 1 denotes the observed wage differential between men and women within the same firm. Gap 2 
describes the gender wage gap under the assumption that male employees would have the same characteristics as 
female employees. Both measures accommodate the censoring of our wage variable by applying Tobit estimates. 
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics on the relationship between selected firm 
characteristics and the GWG within firms. The results indicate that establishments covered 
by industry-wide wage or firm-specific wage agreements pay more equal wages to men and 
women than establishments without any collective wage agreements. Accordingly, the 
existence of a works council seems to reduce the within-firm GWG. It is interesting to note 
that the share of female employees is differently correlated with Gap1 and Gap2. Since Gap1 
includes the wage gap caused by differences in the human capital endowment of men and 
women, it is rather obvious that the correlation is positive in this case. The result reverses 
once differences in observed characteristics are taken into account. That is, establishments 
employing comparatively many women seem to provide more equality among men and 
women than those with a small share of female workers.  
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Table 2: Correlation between Gap1 respectively Gap2 and selected firm characteristics 
Variables Raw Gender Wage 
Gap (Gap1) 
Adjusted Gender 
Wage Gap (Gap2) 
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.050 -0.037 
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.065 -0.068 
Works council -0.136 -0.209 
Female quota (of all employees) 0.108 -0.007 
Number of employees -0.079 -0.104 
Export quota (of all sales ) 0.004 -0.037 
Wage bill per employee 0.044 -0.029 
Relative firm size (employees relative to total 
employment in the industry sector) -0.045 -0.060 
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 20 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
In the appendix, we present summary statistics of all variables entering the wage estimation 
and the GWG estimation. In addition, we show separate summary statistics for firms with 
less and more than 200 employees.  
5. Results 
5.1 First estimation step: wage regression  
To calculate the within-firm GWG under the assumption that male employees had the same 
characteristics as female employees within each firm (Gap2), we first have to determine 
wage estimates for all establishments in our sample. For firms with at least 100 male 
employees, we estimate 2,041 wage equations with a Tobit model in order to account for the 
censoring. The estimated firm-specific wage coefficients are used to determine Gap2 
according to equation (3). This estimation strategy is not applicable for firms with fewer 
employees, because the within-firm estimation would yield no reliable results. For this 
reason, we estimate a pooled wage equation across all male employees in firms with less 
than 100 male employees. Our wage equation is a Mincer-type specification, hence we 
suppose that the individual wage rate is determined by potential experience, potential 
experience squared, job tenure and the education level.  
Since the estimated coefficients from the 2,041 large firms can not be displayed in detail, we 
present a summary of the firm-specific estimation results in larger firms in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Coefficients of the wage estimations in a Tobit model (firms ≥ 100 male employees) 
Coefficients No. of 
Obs. 
(1) 
Mean of 
the coeff.
(2) 
Mean of 
the t-
value 
(3) 
Share of 
significant 
coeff.  
(4) 
Standard 
deviation 
of coeff. 
(5) 
Quotient 
(5)/(2) 
Potential experience 2,041 0.023 6.930 0.857 0.015 0.653 
(Potential experience)2/100 2,041 -0.038 -5.470 0.770 0.029 -0.752 
Job tenure (in days) 2,041 0.000 6.631 0.801 0.000 2.088 
Low education without 
vocational training 1,570 1.405 35.659 0.910 2.167 1.542 
Vocational training 2,025 1.338 38.888 0.818 2.039 1.524 
Secondary school (with 
and without vocational 
training) 
1,248 2.160 48.400 0.852 2.142 0.992 
College of higher 
education or university 1,598 2.046 51.483 0.870 2.075 1.014 
Note: Coefficients result from wage regressions in firms with at least 100 male employees. The first column 
contains the number of different estimated coefficients. The next two columns present the means of the estimated 
coefficients and the t-values over all wage equations. The 4th column shows the share of estimated coefficients 
which are significant at the 5%-level. The 5th column contains the standard deviation of the estimated 
coefficients from the mean coefficient of all firms. The last column includes a quotient between the mean of the 
coefficients and the corresponding standard deviation as absolute values.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
Column 1 describes the number of estimated coefficients for each characteristic. Note that 
some characteristics are missing in some firms, such that specific coefficients can not be 
determined in every firm. The second column presents the mean of the estimated coefficients 
of the firm-specific wage estimations and column 3 shows the corresponding mean of the 
estimated t-values. Note that the table contains coefficients for all possible education levels 
because the left-out category differs from firm to firm. The means of the estimated 
coefficients show that the variables have the expected effect on the wage rate. That is, the 
wage rate increases with the education level and potential experience on average. As 
predicted by Mincer (1974), the squared term of potential experience is negative, hinting at 
diminishing returns to experience. In order to receive a more exact impression of the 
significance of the estimated coefficient, column 4 shows the shares of the estimated 
coefficients which are significant at the 5%-level. We can see that about 80 to 90 percent of 
the estimated coefficients are statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the table 
includes the standard deviation of the estimated coefficients to illustrate the heterogeneity of 
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the wage regressions across firms (see column 5). The last column includes a quotient of the 
standard deviation of the coefficients and the absolute value of the corresponding means. 
Hence, this figure illustrates the standardized variation of coefficients across the firms. High 
values of this quotient indicate that the variation of firm-specific coefficients is high, 
supporting our supposition that the wage setting process differs tremendously across firms. 
Small values are signaling moderate heterogeneity of wage returns to the corresponding 
characteristics. The results in Table 3 point out, for example, that the remuneration of job 
tenure varies much more across firms than the coefficients for experience. In consideration 
of the varying coefficients, the wage estimation in each firm seems to be advantageously to 
determine the correct remuneration of the characteristics. 
In addition to these summary statistics, we also present the 25-, 50- and 75% percentiles of 
the estimated coefficients in Table A9 in the appendix. The results show that also the rather 
“extreme” values of the estimated coefficients indicate the well known fact that education, 
firm tenure and experience have a positive effect on the individual wage level.  
Table 4: Coefficients of the pooled wage estimations in a Tobit model (firms with 20 to 99 male 
employees) 
Coefficients Standard deviation 
of coefficients 
t-value  
   
Potential experience 0.03177 0.00026 124.43000 
(Potential experience)2/100 -0.05389 0.00054 -99.27000 
Job tenure (in days) 0.00002 0.00000 99.28000 
Low education without vocational 
training -0.26575 0.00164 -161.61000 
Vocational training (reference group) - - - 
Secondary school (with and without 
vocational training) 0.20290 0.00258 78.73000 
College of higher education or 
university 0.44774 0.00227 197.57000 
No. of observations 242,304   
Log likelihood -48419.521   
Note: The regression includes male employees from firms with 20 to 99 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the pooled Tobit regression for smaller firms. Note 
that the education level vocational training serves as the one and only reference group in this 
setting. The estimated coefficients are highly significant and also exhibit the expected sizes 
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and signs. That way, male employees with higher education and more experience get higher 
wage rates. Longer spells within the same firm also cause positive effects on the wage rate.  
5.2 Second estimation step: explaining the firm-specific gender wage gap  
As mentioned in Section 2, the estimated coefficients are used to calculate the adjusted 
GWG, Gap2. In order to derive conclusions on the impact of firm characteristics and the 
institutional framework on the GWG, we regress selected firm-level and industry-level 
variables on the raw firm-specific wage gaps (Gap1) and on the adjusted firm-specific wage 
gaps (Gap2). We use the export quota, the firm size as well as the relative firm size to test 
whether firms with market power discriminate more and therefore reveal a higher GWG or 
not. The impact of the institutional framework on the GWG is investigated by including a 
dummy variable for the existence of a works council. Furthermore, we use an interaction 
term between this dummy and the quota of female employees within a firm to test whether 
the effect of employees’ representations depend upon the female share among the staff. In 
order to check the hypothesis that collective wage agreements entail smaller GWGs, we 
distinguish between industry-wide, firm-specific and no wage agreements. In one model 
specification, we also include the female quota of union members in the relevant union, to 
see whether the naive notion of collective bargaining holds. A positive coefficient of the 
female share in the corresponding union would suggest that unions with a high female quota 
are more successful in reducing the wage gap between men and women. Unfortunately, our 
data do not provide any information about which collective bargaining agreement is relevant 
for firm j. We therefore assign each firm to an industry-specific union according to the 
industry affiliation of the firm. This implies, for example, that a firm in the construction 
sector is supposed to be subject to the collective agreement of the union called “IG-Bau”.13 
As a consequence, we assign the same female quota to all firms in the construction sector. 
For this reason, the error terms of firms negotiating with the same union are not independent. 
To adjust for the correlation within each union-cluster, we calculate clustered standard 
errors. Due to the decreasing number of unions14, we can distinguish between seven clusters 
for different unions and one cluster for firms without a wage agreement, only. Since the 
estimation approach requires that firms remain in the same cluster during the whole 
observation period, we lose 943 observations of firms which change their status with respect 
                                                          
13 In case of a firm-specific wage agreement, the firm is supposed to negotiate directly with the corresponding 
union. The female share of the union members is merged in the same way as in the case of industry-wide wage 
agreements. 
14 For instance, five separate unions covering the service sector merged to the large union called “ver.di” in 2001 
and other small unions entered to more powerful unions like the “IG Metall”. 
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to the application of wage agreements. A switch between industry-wide or firm-specific 
wage agreements has no effect on the number of observations. In order to make sure that we 
use as much information as possible and to avoid that our estimation results are affected by 
the restriction of the sample, we include this variable only in an additional model 
specification.  
In all regressions differences between regions, industries and years are captured by several 
control variables. Apart from that, we include the wage bill per employee to control for 
differences between high and low wage firms. Table 5 shows the effects of the selected 
variables on our two measures of the gender earnings gap. The results rely on the whole 
sample as the female share among union members does not enter this baseline specification. 
The estimated coefficients of the control variables region, industry and year dummies are not 
presented here and are available on request. In order to check the robustness of our results 
we also run separate regressions for firms with less than 200 employees and for firms with at 
least 200 employees. Table A10 and A11 in the appendix contain the corresponding results.  
Table 5: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap  
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Number of employees/1000 -0.0107** 0.0027 -0.0117** 0.0025 
(Number of employees/1000)2 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0001 
Relative firm size (employees 
relative to total employment in 
the industry sector) 
0.4470 0.5640 0.0313 0.0542 
Wage bill per employee/100000 0.4143** 0.0094 0.1402 0.0909 
Export quota (of sales)/10 0.0436 0.0879 -0.1722** 0.0837 
Female quota (of all employees) 0.1278** 0.0204 0.0644** 0.0194 
Works council -0.0178** 0.0077 -0.0298** 0.0073 
Works council * Female quota -0.0180 0.0214 -0.0070 0.0203 
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0186** 0.0045 -0.0163** 0.0043 
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0192** 0.0056 -0.0161** 0.0054 
Observations 9,062  9,062  
R2 0.1182  0.1052  
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The results 
are available on inquiry.  ** significant on 5%-level, * significant on 10%-level.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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The results reveal a negative relation between the number of employees and the two 
measures of the GWG, which is in contrast to Becker’s hypothesis that large firms can afford 
more discrimination due to their superior market power. However, the positive coefficient of 
the quadratic term points out that the negative impact of the number of employees decreases 
at a certain firm size. The GWG starts to rise with the number of employees once the firm 
employs more than 18,520 men and women.15 This implies that the Becker’s hypothesis 
saying that very large firms can afford more discrimination due to their market power only 
holds for firms with more than 18,520 employees, which applies to 0.002 % of the sample 
only. The relative firm size in terms of establishment employment relative to the number of 
employees in the industry sector does not seem to support this hypothesis, either.16  
However, the assumption that large firms are more likely to have market power could be too 
simple. Considering, that large firms are more in the focus of the public and suppose that the 
public pressure tends to lower the GWG, then the negative coefficients become plausible. 
The larger effect of firm size on the adjusted GWG supports this explanation. This indicates 
the smaller potential to remunerate equal characteristics differently in large firms due to 
public pressure. Another reason for the smaller GWG in large firms may be the fact, that 
male and female employees are more likely to work in comparable job positions (unless jobs 
are not fully segregated) in large firms. In this case it is more difficult to enforce different 
wage rates for equal jobs because employees can easily compare their tasks and wage rates.  
The export quota – hinting at increased competition on the global markets – has a significant 
negative impact on Gap2, which is in line with Becker’s model. Surprisingly, the export 
quota has no significant effect on Gap1. A look at Table A10 and A11, presenting separate 
results for small and large firms, reveals that the impact on Gap2 is driven by larger firms. In 
firms up to 200 employees the export quota has a weakly positive significant impact on 
Gap1 and there is no effect on Gap2. The overall conclusion with respect to the export quota 
is hence at strife.  
Also the positive impact of the female quota on Gap1 and Gap2 is not in line with the 
hypothesis derived from Becker’s theory. The regressions show that establishments 
employing comparatively many women seem to provide less equality among men and 
women than those with a small share of female workers. One explanation could be that the 
few men working in female dominated establishments mostly hold managerial positions and 
                                                          
15 By calculating this number of employees we assume that the total number of employees in the industry sector 
is constant and for simplification we use the average of the total number of employees in the industry sector.   
16 Alternatively, we calculated the relative firm size in terms of turnover. Again, the results did not provide 
empirical evidence for the hypotheses derived in Section 2.  
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the mass of women perform simple tasks in lower paid positions. A typical example for this 
type of work sharing is the retail industry, where most women are employed as shop 
assistants or cashiers while men mostly work as shop managers. Note that the effect is 
smaller but still significant in the estimation of Gap2. This implies that part of the female 
effect is driven by the gender differences in human capital endowment.  
The significant positive coefficients of the wage bill per employee in regression of Gap1 
exposes that the GWG is larger in high wage firms. This may be due to the so-called glass 
ceiling effect. According to this phenomenon, the wage rate of women is capped at a certain 
threshold, partly because women do not reach the top positions in most firms. As a result, the 
GWG at the right tail of the earnings distribution is higher than at the mean. In the regression 
of Gap2, which controls for differences in the human capital endowment, the effect of the 
firm-specific wage level is insignificant. We therefore conclude that controlling for human 
capital partly explains the larger gender pay differences in high wage establishments. A look 
at Table A10 and A11 reveals that the described pattern holds irrespective of the firm size. 
Concerning the effect of the institutional setting, we find pretty clear and convincing results 
in accordance with Gartner and Stephan (2004). The estimates indicate that the industrial 
relations as well as the wage bargaining regime are linked to the GWG. The existence of a 
works council has a significant negative impact on Gap1 and Gap2. It seems that employees’ 
representations foster equal treatment of male and female employees within establishments. 
The separate regressions for large and small firms (see Table A10 and A11 in the appendix) 
show that this is particularly true for firms with at least 200 employees. Given that 
establishments with at least 200 employees have to exempt at least one member of the works 
council from work, which allows him or her to put more effort in the internal work, it is 
comprehensible that the impact of works councils is more pronounced in firms operating 
beyond this threshold. But even if the linear effect of works councils is statistically not 
different from zero in smaller firms, the Wald-test shows that the works council dummy 
together with the interaction term with the female quota within firms are significantly 
different from zero.  
The interaction between works councils and the female quota within a firm has no significant 
impact in any regression. We therefore conclude that works councils tend to reduce the 
inequality between men and women irrespective of the gender relations within the 
establishment. Even if a high share of female employees does not seem to foster the 
effectiveness of co-determination in terms of wage equality, it may be likely that the female 
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quota among the works council’s members influences the goals of the staff association. 
Given that we have no individual information on the membership in works councils, we can 
not test this hypothesis. 
As the collective bargaining model suggests, firms under collective agreements tend to have 
lower pay gaps between males and females than those without wage agreements. The results 
on the effect of alternative wage bargaining regimes show that the impact of the industry-
wide and firm-specific wage agreements are very similar. A Wald-test indicates that the null 
hypothesis specificfirmindustry −= δδ  cannot be rejected at conventional levels in both 
estimations.17 Since firm-specific contracts are generally bargained by sector-specific 
unions, one possible explanation might be that a considerable fraction of the firm-specific 
contracts simply adopts most conditions negotiated in the corresponding industry agreement 
in order to lower transaction costs.  
Even if these results support the naive notion of unions’ goals, there might be differences in 
the effect on the GWG with respect to the gender composition among the union members. 
We therefore investigate the hypothesis that unions with more female members act more in 
favor of the female interests and hence exhibit a larger effect on the firm-specific wage gap. 
Union membership data are merged on an aggregated sector level (7 categories according to 
the sector classification of the unions) and interacted with a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm is subject to a collective agreement or not. Table 6 presents the results of 
the clustered regression. Note that the number of observations is somewhat smaller due to 
firms switching their union status. Our regressions can not approve the hypothesis. Instead of 
this, the results show a positive relationship between the number of women involved in the 
union and the wage differential within firms. The coefficient of the interaction term is not 
significant, though. The separate regressions for small and large firms reveal that this result 
does not depend on the firm size (see Table A12 and A13 in the appendix). One explanation 
for this surprising result may be that women who work in industries and firms where men 
and women are treated very unequal are more likely to engage in unions in order to actively 
influence the wage structure. Alternatively one may argue that wages are not the most 
important criterion for female union members, but that they are more interested in improving 
the compatibility of family and job by means of family friendly work practices, such as child 
care facilities, human resource measures easing the integration of mothers after employment 
breaks, promotion of part-time employees or flexible work time schedules.  
                                                          
17 The p-values are 0.9046 for the raw wage gap and 0.9730 for the adjusted wage gap. 
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Note that the results of the restricted sample differ in some respect compared to our baseline 
models presented in Table 5. For example, works councils have no significant impact on 
Gap1 anymore. In contrast, the importance of the relative firm size is more evident in the 
clustered regression based on the reduced sample. Given that the explanatory power of the 
union member information is very limited, we rely on the results presented in Table 5.  
Table 6: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap (restricted sample) 
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Number of employees/1000 -0.0103** 0.0025 -0.0109** 0.0028 
(Number of employees/1000)2 0.0003* 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 
Relative firm size (employees 
relative to total employment in 
the industry sector) 
0.1002** 0.0241 0.1020** 0.0179 
Wage bill per employee/100000 0.4032** 0.1741 0.1456 0.1045 
Export quota (of sales)/10 -0.0534 0.0482 -0.2261 0.0361 
Female quota (of all employees) 0.1077** 0.0509 0.0551 0.0431 
Works council -0.0150 0.0153 -0.0270** 0.0126 
Works council * Female quota -0.0027 0.0446 -0.0032 0.0309 
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0448** 0.0102 -0.0338** 0.0119 
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0504** 0.0084 -0.0406** 0.0010 
Collective agreement * Female 
quota of involved union 0.0124 0.0078 0.0184 0.0115 
Observations 8,231  8,231  
R2 0.1234  0.1040  
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The results 
are available on inquiry.  ** significant on 5%-level, * significant on 10%-level.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997, 1999 and 2001 
6. Conclusions 
This study provides a first comprehensive analysis on the effect of various firm 
characteristics and the institutional framework on the GWG in Germany. The specific 
benefit of our research is that we move beyond the individual and consider the importance of 
the workplace to explain gender pay differentials within firms. The empirical analysis is 
based on the German LIAB data, a representative linked employer-employee panel including 
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information on all employees of firms covered by the IAB establishment survey. The data 
allows us to compare not only average male and female wages (of specific groups of 
employees), but to look at within-firm gender wage differentials.  
To do so, we use measures to describe the firm specific GWG. First we use the observed 
GWG and second a wage gap, which is adjusted for the differences in human capital 
characteristics between men and women within establishments. In order to calculate the 
second measure, we estimate separate wage equations – as far as possible – for male 
employees in each firm.  
Our results indicate that the mean GWG within firms is smaller than the mean overall GWG. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that firms bargaining their wages within the framework of 
collective agreements exhibit a smaller gender pay gap. Given that most unions are still 
dominated by men, this result is not self-evident. An additional effect of unions with a higher 
female share is not empirically detectable. Note, however, that a high share of female union 
members is correlated with larger pay differentials, which may reflect the fact that the rather 
pronounced inequality in female dominated firms induces women to get involved with 
unions. The results also point to a gender equalizing effect of formalized co-determination 
(works councils). Again, the hypothesis that works councils only realize the interests of 
women if they represent a larger part of the staff is not supported by the data. Finally, we 
tested Becker’s hypothesis on discrimination using various alternative variables. Apart from 
the results presented above, we used a variable describing the competition in the market as it 
is perceived by the firm in order to test whether stronger competition prevents discrimination 
against women. This variable is only available for 1998, though. Since the perceived 
competition has no significant effect in any regression and does not alter the coefficients of 
all other variables, we refrain from presenting the results. In summary, we can not find 
consistent evidence for the discrimination model, though.  
Apart from the firm characteristics describing the inner life of an organisation in this study, 
the situation in the market may also be important to explain firm-specific wage differentials 
between male and female employees. Robinson (1933) first introduced the idea of 
monopsonistic discrimination in the labor market. According to this, a single employer may 
set wages below the marginal revenue product if there exists no or little competition on the 
factor market. The more inelastic the labor supply, the larger will be the gap between the 
achievable wage rate and the marginal revenue product. By differentiating wages between 
groups with differently elastic labor supply curves, the monopsonist may maximize his 
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profit. For instance, gender can be one dimension along which the employer may 
differentiate. Given the limited job immobility due to family responsibilities of women18, it 
is theoretically conceivable that female labor supply is less elastic than male labor supply. In 
case of monopsonistic power, women will hence have to accept higher wage cuts then men 
relative to their productivity. Unfortunately, we must refrain from an empirical examination 
of this hypothesis, because we have no information which captures market power on the 
factor market. An empirical specification of the new models developed by Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) and Manning (2003), saying that each employer faces its own individual 
labor supply curve, would be very promising, if the necessary information were available.19  
                                                          
18 The reasons for the lower job mobility of women are manifold. First, the availability of family-friendly jobs is 
still limited. In this setting, wages become a less important job criterion compared to flexible working time 
regimes, commute or career perspectives for part-time employees. Second, since husbands earn higher wages in 
general, local mobility is mostly driven by men.  
19 In principle, one would need gender specific labor turnover rates, strictly speaking the resignation rate of men 
and women and the potential to recruit new male and female employees for each firm. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Description of the sample and the gender wage gap in firms with at least 100 male 
employees 
year Number of 
firms  
(1) 
Number of 
male 
employees 
(2) 
Number of 
female 
employees 
(3) 
Within-firm 
GWG based 
on reported 
value (in 
logarithm) 
(4) 
Within-firm 
GWG (in 
logarithm) 
(5) 
Overall 
GWG (in 
logarithm) 
(6) 
1997 916 660,393 168,252 0.187 0.171 0.197
1998 930 610,578 158,840 0.183 0.166 0.206
1999 926 549,510 142,899 0.179 0.163 0.207
2000 1,230 613,558 154,185 0.177 0.161 0.208
2001 1,335 675,145 169,301 0.176 0.159 0.208
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 100 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
Table A2: Description of the sample and the gender wage gap in firms with 20 to 99 male 
employees  
year Number of 
firms  
(1) 
Number of 
male 
employees 
(2) 
Number of 
female 
employees 
(3) 
Within-firm 
GWG based 
on reported 
value (in 
logarithm) 
(4) 
Within-firm 
GWG (in 
logarithm) 
(5) 
Overall 
GWG (in 
logarithm) 
(6) 
1997 654 29,978 24,968 0.227 0.217 0.197
1998 751 34,125 26,224 0.225 0.215 0.206
1999 782 34,591 25,054 0.220 0.209 0.207
2000 1,513 65,219 38,719 0.219 0.208 0.208
2001 1,755 78,391 47,337 0.216 0.203 0.208
Note: The results refer to firms with 20 to 99 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A3: Summary statistic of individual characteristics (pooled over 1997-2001) 
Variables Men Women 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
log wage 4.580 0.253 4.392 0.304 
low education without 
vocational training 0.126 0.331 0.202 0.401 
vocational training 0.711 0.453 0.618 0.486 
Secondary. school (with and 
without vocational training) 0.047 0.212 0.118 0.323 
college of higher education or 
university 0.117 0.321 0.062 0.241 
potential experience 21.959 9.665 20.039 10.733 
(potential experience)2/100 5.756 4.449 5.168 4.677 
job tenure in days  4,147.084 2,866.909 3,460.537 2,696.860 
censored wage rate 0.143 0.350 0.039 0.194 
Observations 3,351,488   955,779   
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 20 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
Table A4: Summary statistic of individual characteristics for the firm-specific wage regressions 
(pooled over 1997-2001) 
Variables Men Women 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
log wage 4.591 0.245 4.426 0.291 
low education without vocational training 0.125 0.330 0.201 0.401 
vocational training 0.709 0.454 0.605 0.489 
secondary. school (with and without 
vocational training) 0.047 0.211 0.126 0.332 
college of higher education or university 0.120 0.324 0.068 0.252 
potential experience 21.942 9.641 19.759 10.682 
(potential experience)2/100 5.744 4.434 5.045 4.626 
job tenure 4,230.000 2,863.652 3,557.205 2,714.546 
censored wage rate 0.147 0.354 0.044 0.206 
Observations 3,109,184   793,477   
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 100 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A5: Summary statistic of individual characteristics for the pooled wage regression (pooled 
over 1997-2001) 
Variables Men Women 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
log wage 4.437 0.311 4.227 0.310 
low education without vocational training 0.138 0.344 0.208 0.406 
vocational training 0.732 0.443 0.680 0.467 
secondary. school (with and without 
vocational training) 0.053 0.224 0.079 0.270 
college of higher education or university 0.078 0.267 0.033 0.179 
potential experience 22.166 9.964 21.407 10.877 
(potential experience)2/100 5.906 4.634 5.766 4.874 
job tenure 3,083.127 2,690.437 2,987.943 2,556.595 
censored wage rate 0.085 0.279 0.013 0.114 
Observations 242,304   162,302   
Note: The results refer to firms with 20-99 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A6: Summary statistic of firm characteristics (pooled over 1997-2001) 
 Total Sample Restricted Sample 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
raw gender wage gap (Gap1) 0.200 0.160 0.196 0.158 
adjusted gender wage gap (Gap2) 0.148 0.147 0.143 0.145 
number of employees 729.860 1,805.010 760.155 1,873.212
relative firm size (employees relative to total  
employment in the industry sector) 
0.014 0.032 0.014 0.032 
wage bill per employee 4,863.420 1,606.213 4,883.921 1,609.065
female quota (all employees) 0.307 0.229 0.306 0.229 
industry-wide wage agreement 0.747 0.434 0.784 0.412 
firm-specific wage agreement 0.098 0.298 0.092 0.290 
export quota (sales) 0.156 0.240 0.156 0.240 
works council 0.823 0.381 0.839 0.368 
works council *  female quota (of all employees) 0.263 0.245 0.266 0.243 
wage agreement (industry-wide or firm-specific) 0.846 0.361 0.877 0.329 
wage agreement * female quota in union 0.286 0.219 0.297 0.216 
agriculture and forestry; electricity, gas and water  
supply, mining 
0.030 0.170 0.310 0.173 
manufacturing I 0.157 0.364 0.153 0.360 
manufacturing II 0.335 0.472 0.331 0.471 
construction 0.060 0.237 0.063 0.243 
wholesale and retail trade 0.096 0.294 0.095 0.293 
transport and communication 0.053 0.225 0.056 0.229 
financial intermediation 0.073 0.261 0.080 0.271 
real state, renting and business activities  0.059 0.236 0.060 0.240 
education 0.022 0.148 0.023 0.148 
other service activities  0.114 0.318 0.109 0.312 
Berlin-West 0.055 0.228 0.055 0.228 
Schleswig Holstein 0.019 0.137 0.193 0.138 
Hamburg   0.064 0.244 0.067 0.250 
Niedersachsen 0.124 0.330 0.123 0.328 
Bremen   0.037 0.190 0.038 0.191 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.233 0.423 0.234 0.424 
Hesse  0.086 0.280 0.088 0.283 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.068 0.252 0.066 0.248 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.148 0.355 0.145 0.352 
Bavaria   0.145 0.352 0.143 0.351 
Observations 10,792   9,797  
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 20 male employees. The restricted sample does not contain firms 
switching their union status.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A7: Summary statistic of firm characteristics in firms with less than 200 employees 
(pooled over 1997-2001) 
 Total Sample Restricted Sample 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
raw gender wage gap (Gap1) 0.223 0.200 0.217 0.197 
adjusted gender wage gap (Gap2) 0.182 0.189 0.176 0.189 
number of employees 96.039 48.209 97.054 48.476 
relative firm size (employees relative to total  
employment in the industry sector) 
0.004 0.014 0.004 0.012 
wage bill per employee 4,718.398 1,669.772 4,740.304 1,691.717
female quota (all employees) 0.251 0.195 0.252 0.198 
industry-wide wage agreement 0.674 0.469 0.717 0.450 
firm-specific wage agreement 0.083 0.275 0.074 0.261 
export quota (of sales) 0.108 0.200 0.101 0.195 
works council 0.647 0.478 0.667 0.471 
works council *  female quota (of all employees) 0.166 0.203 0.171 0.204 
wage agreement (industry-wide or firm-specific) 0.757 0.429 0.791 0.407 
wage agreement * female quota in union 0.250 0.227 0.263 0.227 
agriculture and forestry; electricity, gas and water  
supply, mining 
0.022 0.147 0.024 0.154 
manufacturing I 0.144 0.352 0.135 0.342 
manufacturing II 0.314 0.465 0.298 0.457 
construction 0.108 0.311 0.117 0.322 
wholesale and retail trade 0.138 0.345 0.140 0.347 
transport and communication 0.060 0.238 0.064 0.244 
financial intermediation 0.055 0.228 0.061 0.240 
real state, renting and business activities  0.086 0.280 0.091 0.288 
education 0.013 0.115 0.014 0.115 
other service activities  0.057 0.233 0.056 0.230 
Berlin-West 0.055 0.228 0.054 0.227 
Schleswig Holstein 0.021 0.144 0.022 0.145 
Hamburg   0.082 0.274 0.088 0.284 
Niedersachsen 0.151 0.358 0.148 0.355 
Bremen   0.059 0.235 0.061 0.239 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.194 0.395 0.195 0.400 
Hesse  0.803 0.272 0.083 0.280 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.072 0.258 0.068 0.252 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.139 0.344 0.131 0.338 
Bavaria   0.121 0.326 0.117 0.322 
Observations 4,508   3,935  
Note: The results refer to firms with less than 200 employees. The restricted sample does not contain firms 
switching their union status.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A8: Summary statistic of firm characteristics in firms with at least 200 employees (pooled 
over 1997-2001) 
 Total Sample Restricted Sample 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
raw gender wage gap (Gap1) 0.184 0.124 0.182 0.124 
adjusted gender wage gap (Gap2) 0.123 0.101 0.121 0.100 
number of employees 1,184.549 2,258.100 1,205.277 2,317.286
relative firm size (employees relative to total  
employment in the industry sector) 
0.021 0.038 0.021 0.038 
wage  bill per employee 4,969.686 1,549.551 4,982.443 1,542.268
female quota (all employees) 0.348 0.243 0.343 0.241 
industry-wide wage agreement 0.800 0.400 0.828 0.377 
firm-specific wage agreement 0.109 0.312 0.106 0.308 
export quota (of sales) 0.192 0.260 0.019 0.026 
works council 0.950 0.219 0.954 0.210 
works council *  female quota (of all employees) 0.333 0.250 0.330 0.250 
wage agreement (industry-wide or firm-specific) 0.910 0.287 0.934 0.248 
wage agreement * female quota in union 0.312 0.210 0.319 0.206 
agriculture and forestry; electricity, gas and water  
supply, mining 
0.035 0.185 0.035 0.184 
manufacturing I 0.166 0.372 0.166 0.372 
manufacturing II 0.350 0.477 0.353 0.478 
construction 0.025 0.156 0.026 0.160 
wholesale and retail trade 0.065 0.247 0.065 0.246 
transport and communication 0.048 0.214 0.050 0.218 
financial intermediation 0.087 0.281 0.092 0.290 
real state, renting and business activities  0.040 0.196 0.040 0.195 
education 0.029 0.167 0.029 0.166 
other service activities  0.155 0.362 0.145 0.352 
Berlin-West 0.055 0.228 0.055 0.229 
Schleswig Holstein 0.017 0.131 0.018 0.132 
Hamburg   0.051 0.220 0.052 0.223 
Niedersachsen 0.110 0.307 0.110 0.310 
Bremen   0.022 0.147 0.023 0.148 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.261 0.439 0.261 0.439 
Hesse  0.090 0.286 0.091 0.288 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.066 0.248 0.065 0.246 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.156 0.362 0.153 0.360 
Bavaria   0.162 0.368 0.161 0.368 
Observations 6,284   5,862  
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 200 employees. The restricted sample does not contain firms 
switching their union status.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A9: Coefficients of the wage estimations in Tobit models in large firms, percentiles  
Percentile Percentile Percentile Coefficients Number of 
Obs. 25 % 50 % 75 % 
Potential experience 2,041 0.012 0.021 0.031 
(Potential experience)2/100 2,041 -0.054 -0.034 -0.019 
Job tenure (in days) 2,041 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Low education without vocational 
training 1,570 -0.445 -0.161 3.939 
Vocational training 2,025 -0.210 0.111 4.061 
Secondary school (with and 
without vocational training) 1,248 0.126 0.634 4.347 
College of higher education or 
university 1,598 0.272 0.599 4.507 
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 100 male employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
Table A10: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap in firms with less than 200 
employees  
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Number of employees/1000 -0.7723** 0.3274 -0.6024* 0.3208 
(Number of employees/1000)2 2.5417* 1.4518 1.8571 1.4228 
Relative firm size (employees 
relative to total employment in the 
industry sector) 
-0.1169 0.1786 -0.0726 0.1763 
Wage bill per employee/100000 0.7550** 0.1863 0.3080* 0.1840 
Export quota (of sales)/10 0.3562* 0.1839 -0.0016 0.1796 
Female quota (of all employees) 0.1730** 0.0314 0.1007** 0.0307 
Works council -0.0077 0.0118 -0.0162 0.0115 
Works council * Female quota -0.0393 0.0357 -0.0389 0.0349 
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0188** 0.0076 -0.0190** 0.0075 
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0182* 0.0103 -0.0143 0.0102 
Observations 3,895  3,895  
R2 0.089  0.080  
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The results 
are available on inquiry.  ** significant on 5%-level, * significant on 10%-level.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A11: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap in firms with at least 200 
employees  
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Number of employees/1000 -0.0059** 0.0021 -0.0068** 0.0018 
(Number of employees/1000)2 0.0020** 0.0001 0.0022** 0.0001 
Relative firm size (employees 
relative to total employment in the 
industry sector) 
0.0751* 0.0414 0.0875** 0.0366 
Wage bill per employee/100000 0.1546* 0.0860 0.0388 0.0760 
Export quota (of sales)/10 -0.0709 0.0784 -0.1667** 0.0688 
Female quota (of all employees) 0.0618** 0.0284 0.0287 0.0249 
Works council -0.2617** 0.0123 -0.2230** 0.0109 
Works council * Female quota -0.0434 0.0283 -0.0367 0.0250 
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0162** 0.0048 -0.0092** 0.0042 
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0155* 0.0056 -0.0103* 0.0050 
Observations 5,167  5,167  
R2 0.1905  0.1175  
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The results 
are available on inquiry.  ** significant on 5%-level, * significant on 10%-level.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A12: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap in firms with less than 200 
employees, restricted sample  
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Number of employees/1000 -1.0346 0.7524 -0.7216 0.8600 
(Number of employees/1000)2 3.6174 2.9396 2.3084 3.2964 
Relative firm size (employees 
relative to total employment in the 
industry sector) 
0.0426 0.1222 0.0832 0.1293 
Wage bill per employee/100000 0.7374** 0.3541 0.3090 0.1991 
Export quota (of sales)/10 0.0977 0.1299 -0.1731 0.1107 
Female quota (of all employees) 0.1448** 0.0616 0.0911** 0.0529 
Works council -0.0055 0.0179 -0.0143 0.0185 
Works council * Female quota -0.0056 0.0556 -0.0252 0.0408 
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0358** 0.0141 -0.0231 0.0143 
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0430** 0.0097 -0.0280** 0.0078 
Wage agreement * Female quota of 
involved union (of union members) 0.0063 0.0110 0.0017 0.0112 
Observations 3,407  3,407  
R2 0.093  0.0802  
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The results 
are available on inquiry.  ** significant on 5%-level, * significant on 10%-level.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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Table A13: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap in firms with at least 200 
employees, restricted sample  
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
      
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Number of employees/1000 -0.0057** 0.0024 -0.0063** 0.0031 
(Number of employees/1000)2 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Relative firm size (employees 
relative to total employment in the 
industry sector) 
0.1037** 0.0287 0.1112** 0.0273 
Wage bill per employee/100000 0.1967 0.1479 0.0699 0.1030 
Export quota (of sales)/10 -0.0696 0.0605 -0.161** 0.0518 
Female quota (of all employees) 0.0620 0.0410 0.0201 0.0379 
Works council -0.0238 0.0194 -0.0207 0.0138 
Works council * Female quota -0.0445 0.0370 -0.0434 0.0271 
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0449** 0.0047 -0.0331** 0.0071 
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0492** 0.0077 -0.0396** 0.0093 
Wage agreement * Female quota of 
involved union (of union members) 0.0064 0.0111 0.0221 0.0154 
Observations 4,824  4,824  
R2 0.1984  0.1237  
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The results 
are available on inquiry.  ** significant on 5%-level, * significant on 10%-level.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1997-2001 
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